Democratietheorieën

Kelsen (1920): partijenstaat
Typerend voor het relativisme van Kelsen is het onderscheid tussen politieke ideologie en realiteit. Er bestaat in een democratie niet zoiets als de absolute waarheid; de autocratie wordt daarentegen gekenmerkt door de claim over de absolute waarheid te beschikken.

Sommige auteurs menen in de theorie van Kelsen een contradictie te bespeuren: "een absolute waarheid bestaat niet, dus de meerderheid dient te beslissen." Dit is een te ongenuanceerde lezing van Kelsen. Mertens komt met een goede samenvatting van de gedachte van Kelsen: "Je bent democraat als je bereid bent te aanvaarden dat de waarheid relatief is. Dat impliceert de bereidheid om de mening van de ander te aanvaarden als rechtsregel, wanneer die mening op democratische wijze een meerderheid achter zich heeft verzameld." (Mertens, 2012)

In Kelsens opvatting is de democratie een partijenstaat, gebaseerd op vrijheid. Dat beeld komt overeen met de tijdgeest (1920): het ontstaan van politieke partijen kon niet langer worden genegeerd door de toentertijd bestaande instituties. Het is duidelijk dat Kelsen de integratiefunctie van de politieke partij als een positieve factor beschouwt voor het ontwikkelen van een "gemeenschapswil". In het bestaande model is de volkswil niet meer dan een compromis tussen de versnipperde belangen van individuen. De politieke partij kan bovendien zelfs worden gezien als de aanzet om een daadwerkelijk "volk" te doen ontstaan:

"De onderverdeling van het volk in politieke partijen betekent in feite dat: de organisatorische voorwaarde voor het tot stand komen van dergelijke compromissen, dat de mogelijkheid daarvoor geschapen wordt, dat de gemeenschapswil zich beweegt in de richting van een in het midden gelegen lijn. Juist omdat de democratie als partijenstaat de gemeenschapswil alleen als resultante van de partij-willen wil laten ontstaan, kan zij afzien van de fictie van een boven de partijen staande 'organische' algemene wil. De democratische ontwikkeling laat de massa van individuen tot (constitutioneel verankerde) politieke partijen integreren en ontketent daarmee sociale entiteiten die men als volk kan aanduiden."

Waarom is de parlementaire democratie niet voldoende om "democratisch" te heten? Omdat, volgens Kelsen, de politieke vrijheid tot niet meer dan een stemrecht verwordt. De natuurlijke vrijheid wordt ingeperkt tot politieke zelfbeschikking op basis van meerderheidsbesluiten, het ideële begrip van volk wordt gereduceerd tot diegenen die stemrecht hebben en hun stem ook uitbrengen. Op die wijze wordt de sociale werkelijkheid die de democratie wordt genoemd, niet daadwerkelijk gecreëerd.

Schumpeter (1942): elitisme
Schumpeter richt zich tegen de klassieke sociaal contractstheorieën: er bestaat niet zoiets als de "volonté générale" of een gemeenschappelijke wil van de bevolking.  Aangezien de besluitvorming door het volk niet gericht is op het gemeenschappelijk belang, leidt de regering door het volk tot onacceptabele uitkomsten.

In de opvatting van Schumpeter is democratie daadwerkelijk een concurrentiestrijd tussen politieke elites, om de stem van het volk en daarmee een strijd om de macht.

Dahl (1956): pluralisme
De kritiek van Dahl op de procedures richt zich in eerste instantie op het Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances. Het Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances beoogt de democratie te bewaken tegen de "tirannie der meerderheid".  Vanuit theoretisch perspectief is het volgens Dahl niet duidelijk, waarom een meerderheid noodzakelijkerwijs leidt tot tirannie. Vanuit het empirische perspectief kan niet worden verklaard, waarom het model sterk geconcentreerd is rond instituties en niet ook rond sociale en democratische aspecten.

Een ander punt van kritiek is dat de bescherming tegen de tirannie der meerderheid, nu juist resulteert in de tirannie van de minderheid. Het populistisch model, waarin democratie wordt beschouwd als de integratie van politieke gelijkheid, volkssoevereiniteit en regering door de meerderheid, volstaat niet, omdat het zelden zo is dat de meerderheid regeert. De conclusie van Dahl is dan ook, dat democratie in feite "regering door een minderheid" en "regering door minderheden" is.

Ely: representatieve democratie, volgens Madison checks and balances
Ely neemt het bestaande Madisoniaanse systeem van checks and balances als uitgangspunt. De procedure dient de representatieve democratie te bewaken. Daarbij moeten de visies en belangen van alle betrokkenen worden meegewogen. De taak van de rechter is om de grondrechten te beschermen, maar wel in beperkte mate: zo wordt de uitkomst van de politieke besluitvorming niet materieel getoetst; slechts de grondrechten die onontbeerlijk zijn voor de representatieve democratie, dienen te worden beschermd. Het door Ely als fundamenteel beschouwde gelijkheidsbeginsel, betekent in de praktijk vooral formele gelijkheid. De kritiek op Ely luidt dan ook, dat materiële gelijkheid met zijn theorie niet zal worden bereikt.

Overeenkomsten en verschillen Ely en Dworkin
Zowel Ely als Dworkin neemt de bestaande constituties (Madisonian checks and balances) tot uitgangspunt van de door hen ontwikkelde democratietheorieën; een andere belangrijke overeenkomst tussen beide auteurs, is dat de rechter de grondrechten die van belang zijn voor het functioneren van de democratie en de kwaliteit van het politieke proces, dient te beschermen.

Dworkin heeft in het bijzonder de procedurele aard van Ely's visie bekritiseerd: "Whether the value of the political opportunities a system provides is equal, will depend on whether the legislation likely at the end of the procedure treats everyone as equals". 

Het gelijkheidsbeginsel, "equal concern and respect", aldus Dworkin, heeft betrekking op de materiële uitkomst van het politieke proces (output); voor de input dient een andere maatstaf te worden ontwikkeld. In de visie van Dworkin heeft de Supreme Court bovendien de taak om álle grondrechten te beschermen, niet slechts de grondrechten die wezenlijk zijn voor het waarborgen van de integriteit van democratische procedures.

Dworkin: constitutionele democratie
Dworkin verwerpt de meerderheidslezing, de "majoritarian premise", die hij als volgt omschrijft:

"The majoritarian premise insists that politcal procedures should be designed so, that the decision that is reached, is the decision that a majority or plurality of citizens would favor, if it had adequate information and enough time for reflection."

"People who assume that the majoritarian premise is the ultimate definition of democracy, accept that on some occasions the majority should not govern. Though, it does insist that, even if some derogation from majoritarian government is justified, something morally regrettable has happened. The premise supposes, in other words, that it is always unfair when a political majority is not allowed to have its way."

Vervolgens wordt de constitutionele opvatting van democratie voorgesteld:

"The constitutional conception of democracy takes the defining aim of democracy to be a different one: that collective decisions be made by political institutions, whose structure, composition and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and respect."

Uit de laatste zin, "Political institutions should treat individuals with equal concern and respect", wordt het volgende afgeleid:
a. equal concern relates to "human beings are capable of suffering and frustration";
b. equal respect relates to "human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived".
c. equal concern and respect does not imply equal treatment; rather, it implies treatment as an equal.

Uit deze kenschets van de constitutionele opvatting van democratie, "equal respect and concern", vloeien de volgende criteria voort:
1. gelijke stem;
2. besluitvorming op basis van het meerderheidsprincipe (N.B. anders dan "majoritarian premise"! Meerderheidsbeginsel wordt hier gelezen als één van de onderdelen van de democratie (naast mensenrechten); eveneens gebaseerd op gelijkheidsbeginsel van gelijke zorg en respect);
3. meerderheidsbeginsel aangevuld met bescherming van minderheden door grondrechten (corrigerende factor op meerheidsprincipe);
4. bescherming van de grondrechten door Supreme Court.

Literatuur
Burg, W. van der, Het democratisch perspectief (1991);
Dworkin, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise;
Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie (1929)
Mertens, Eenieder heeft recht op deelname aan het bestuur (2012).

Theories of Democracy: Schumpeter

Schumpeter, 'Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy' (1942)
Schumpeter defines the eighteenth-century theories on democracy as follows: it is the 'democratic method that is an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, which realizes common good by making people decide through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will.'

The first objection to this generally accepted definition, according to Schumpeter, is that "There is no such thing as a uniquely determined common good that all people could agree on or be made to agree on by the force of rational argument." This is due to the fundamental fact that the common good has different meaning to different people and groups; irreducible differences of ultimate values are faced.

The second objection is that, even if a sufficiently defined common good would be acceptable to all, the answers to individual issues would not be definite as well: "Opinions on these might differ to an important enough extent to produce [..] "fundamental" dissention about end themselves."

Schumpeter's last objection reads that, as a consequence of both preceding arguments, the particular concept of the will of the volonté générale, that the utilitarians made their own, vanishes into thin air, for "that concept presupposes the existence of a uniquely determined common good, discernible to all."  The utilitarians derived their 'will of the people'  from the wills of individuals. Unless all individual wills will gravitate into a common good, we will not get that particular type of 'natural' volonté générale. This kind of an utilitarian volonté générale is gone as soon as the concept of common good itself fails to exist.

As Schumpeter concludes: "If results that prove in the long run satisfactory to the people at large are made the test of government for the people, then government by the people, as conceived by the classical doctrine of democracy, would often fail to meet it."

Thus, Schumpeter makes clear that:
1. There is no sufficiently defined "common good";
2. Opinions on the answers to individual issues would differ such that there will be fundamental dissention about end themselves;
3. The utilitarian conception of volonté générale as derived from the "wills of individuals" proves to be a wrong conception, hence is why this kind of a general will is deemed to fail as soon as the common good itself fails to exist.

Schumpeter develops an alternative theory of democracy. "It will be remembered that the chief troubles about the classical theory is that "the people" hold a definite and rational opinion about every individual question and that they give effect to this opinion by choosing representatives to carry out that opinion."

This theory is replaced with Schumpeter's view: "The role of the people is to produce a government, or else an intermediate body. And we define: the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's voice."

Social contract theories: a comparison of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau

History of social contract theories
Social contract theories have been around since the first forms of society arose in the ancient world, one of the best known dialogues being Plato's De Res Publica, which sets out that the principle of social contract is to establish convenants in order to enforce the mutual agreement neither to inflict injustice, nor to suffer injustice.

Marsilius of Padua would develop a theory quite similar to modern-day social contract theories. In his writing, Defensor Pacis (1324), he states that not the Church, but the prince has autonomy and the right of jurisdiction within his territory, only to be bound by mandate of the people and their consent, as the people are the source of all political power and government. The prince has to carry out his obligations- if he fails to do so by violating the law, he will be punished.

Common features of and differences between Social Contract Theories: a comparison

1. State of Nature
1.1. Hobbes
The original state is the State of Nature, in which men have no order, no law and no bodies to enforce law. How the "State of Nature" is viewed by a social contract theorist, depends on the context in which the author himself is placed: witnessing a series of civil wars, it is understandable that Hobbes predicted life in a state of nature to be "brutish and short" and that only absolutism would make an end of this actual state of war in the seventeenth century.

1.2. Locke
Although Locke's State of Nature, a pre-political state, is not considered devoid of morality- on the contrary, the State of Nature is the state of liberty where people even recognize the Law of Nature and therefore do not harm each other- the equality of men and a lack of organization is what will amount to a rather insecure and unsafe state of being. Emphasizing the individual right to "Life, Liberty and Estate", the right to Property, it should not surprise that Locke has written his thesis in favor of the rising middle class in the spirit of the early Age of Enlightenment. That is probably the main reason why Locke's conceptions of the "State of Nature" and the social contract cannot be as unyielding as Hobbes' conceptions were- but then again, Locke's writings were published after the Glorious Revolution (1688); worlds apart from the English Civil War that has inspired Hobbes to writing his infamous Leviathan (1651).

1.3. Rousseau
Rousseau spent his days in the French salons chatting about on intellectual topics, but it is presumably Rousseau who marked the end of the 'Ancien Régime' with his criticism of Louis the Great and his successors until Louis Capet (XVI). His view of the "State of Nature" is surprisingly positive: the State of Nature seemed like paradise, but the introduction of property and civilian culture has made it impossible for man to stay in the State of Nature. In that respect,
"Contrat social" (1780)  is clear and concise on the importance of establishing society on a "volonté générale" rather than on a "volonté de tous".

General comments
I would go as far as to say that Hobbes' Leviathan accurately describes the world we live in, whereas Locke seemed merely blinded by the favor of his audience: as life in the State of Nature was all that perfect and men would, by nature, live up to their obligations, then it is rather inconsistent to suppose that only the acquisition of property leads to unsafety and that a simple increase in conflicts would amount to a state of war.

It seems to me that, behind his rhetoric, Locke makes a quite similar point. His State of Nature may not be equal to a State of War like it is in Hobbes' view, but the State of Nature will result in a State of War to the slightest somehow.
I would not say that an abolute sovereign is the solution to modern global troubles (on the contrary), but it goes to show that on a global scale, the lack of effective government indeed in the event results in a poor and brutish life, overall unsafety and insecurity.

2. Pactum unionis and (subsequent) pactum subjectionis
Common to all social contract theories are either pactum unionis or pactum subjectionis, or a simultaneous application of both pacta, sometimes referred to as the first being the "phase of historical fact" and the latter being the "phase of legal reason" The pactum unionis implies that men have passed from a State of Nature to a State of Society by means of a contract by which they have imposed on themselves the obligation to respect each others rights, thus, a pact with horizontal effect; the pactum subjectionis implies that people undertake to obey the government, chosen by them
(W. Friedman, Natural Law and Social Contract, London 1967, p.118).

Comparing Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, it becomes clear that Hobbes has envisioned solely a pactum subjectionis, for only an absolute sovereign could govern effectively; Locke envisioned the pactum unionis and pactum subjectionis subsequently; in Rousseau's theory, as the sovereign is inherent to "volonté générale", as there is no higher authority or power, no other pact than the pactum unionis is essential to his conception of social contract.

With regards to Locke, the subsequent conclusion of the pactum unionis and subjectionis is stated clearly: "The great chief end of men's uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property (Life, Liberty and Estate).

3. Marking the end of the Ages of "divine law" and Medieval incorporate personality
One main feature that is common to all social contract theories, is that the source of all political power lies within the people; this view distincts the early Ages of Enlightenment from the Medieval Period, in which the idea of the existence of "divine law", granting political authority to the sovereign, would govern the people.
According to Friedman, another common feature is the individualistic and "atomistic conception" of society, in that the state is the legal creation of indivdual will, as opposed to the organic view of society and incorporate personality as was applicable to society in the Medieval.

4. Transfer of natural rights
In the Hobbesian view, natural reason dictates man to self-preservation. In pursuit of the escape of this state of permanent insecurity, man transfers all of his rights to the sovereign. The power of the ruler needs to be absolute, man should obey without any reservations. There is no contractual right by which subjects could demand the fulfilment of obligations by the Leviathan. "Governments without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure man at all."
Hobbes' thought construction is utilitarian, in the sense that nothing but self-interest has led man to invoke the security of an absolute ruler who carries the sword on behalf of man. (Friedman, 1967)

Unlike Hobbes, Locke's social contract is conditionally: government is regarded a party to the contract and man is able to demand the fulfilment of obligations. Locke's social contract serves to limit the power of government and secure the right of property. Man does not transfer these fundamental rights of life, liberty and estate. Natural rights are transferred only partially, solely on the purpose of not rendering the effect of the contract. These rights are the right to self-preservation, which is transferred to Parliament, and the right to punish, which is transferred to the executive.